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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper will address the question of whether an arbitration 
agreement in writing that has been subsequently amended orally by the 
parties can be validated by reference to the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The 
paper will also deal with the question of whether an arbitration agreement 
brought to life with reference to the CISG can withstand a challenge in the 
country of the seat of the arbitral tribunal and remain valid for the purposes 
of enforcement. Some attention will also be paid to the standards that the 
tribunal or a court can employ to determine the parties’ consent to arbitrate. 
The paper will focus on a hypothetical (presented below) in which two 
parties are unfortunate enough to have orally amended their agreement to 
arbitrate. All issues in this paper will be discussed with this fact pattern in 
mind. 
A party located in country X (Party X, Buyer) negotiates a contract of 
sale with a party located in country Y (Party Y, Seller) (both countries are 
parties to the New York Convention, the UNICTRAL Model Arbitration 
Law, and the CISG). Country Y is an Article 96 reserving state, and it does 
not consider itself bound by CISG Article 11 which states that a contract of 
sale need not be concluded or evidenced in writing, and is not subject to 
any requirement as to form. The Article 96 reservation applies as long as 
one of the parties has its place of business in a reserving state. 
Party X is a medium-sized importer engaged primarily in textile 
trading. After two and a half years in business, X is hoping to expand its 
reach to bigger wholesale chains as soon as possible. With a view to this 
goal, X’s staff surveys potential suppliers in different countries and contacts 
the national chambers of commerce in each country of interest to obtain a 
list of reliable suppliers. Y was one of several suppliers with which X later 
decided to negotiate on a deal. During the negotiations, Party X sent its own 
standard terms to Party Y. The terms provided for arbitration in the 
Arbitration Court at X Federal Chamber of Commerce. 
Party Y objected to the arbitration clause due to: 1) the distance to the 
seat of arbitration, 2) a presumed home forum advantage to X, and 3) the 
high fees charged by the Federal Arbitration Court. The parties amended 
their arbitration clause by phone. 
The amended arbitration clause agreed to by Party X and Party Y 
allegedly provided for arbitration in Singapore. The parties did not make 
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this agreement in writing. The Seller, nevertheless, shipped the goods and 
the Buyer accepted. Subsequently, a dispute arose as to the quality of the 
textiles that Seller provided. Party X, the Buyer, sued Y, the Seller, in the 
Federal Arbitration Court of X to recover damages. Seller’s counsel 
challenged the jurisdiction of the X Arbitration Court based on the 
arbitration agreement amended by the parties by phone. Seller argued that 
the CISG, as the law applicable to the main contract, should also be applied 
to determine the content of the arbitration clause concluded between the 
parties. The CISG, if found to be applicable, would enable Seller Y to prove 
that there was in fact an arbitration agreement different from the one 
contained in Buyer’s standard contract. Buyer, on the other hand, argued 
that even if the amended arbitration agreement is found to exist, it would be 
unenforceable according to both the New York Convention and the 
applicable domestic law of the Seller. 
II. SEPARABILITY: SEPARATE OR SEPARABLE? 
Our inquiry will start from the arbitration doctrine of separability, 
which defines the relationship between the main contract and the arbitration 
agreement in question. The doctrine of separability recognizes the 
arbitration clause in a main contract 
[A]s a separate contract, independent and distinct from the main contract. The 
essence of the doctrine is that the validity of an arbitration clause is not bound to 
that of the main contract, and vice versa. Therefore the illegality or termination 
of the main contract does not affect the jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal 
based on an arbitration clause contained in that contract.1 
In case of a dispute as to whether the main contract was validly formed, the 
doctrine of competence will still allow an arbitrator to determine whether 
he is competent to hear the dispute when deciding on its competence, the 
arbitral tribunal need not inquire into the validity of the main contract.2 
Although the doctrine of separability is generally associated with 
arbitration agreements, a very similar principle is also found within the 
CISG. Article 81 states that any provision for “resolution of disputes” 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 102 
(2003). 
2 KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 147 (1993). 
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survives the remedy of avoidance. Provisions for resolution of disputes 
“would ‘normally include choice of law clauses’ among those surviving 
avoidance under Article 81.”3 
It is widely agreed that the CISG “does not govern the question of 
jurisdiction of the courts.”4 However, “forum selection clauses and 
arbitration clauses . . . often form part of a general contract, [and therefore], 
the often controversial question of whether the parties agreed upon such a 
procedural clause is closely related to the question of the conclusion of the 
contract in general.”5 The question of the existence of an agreement to 
arbitrate is a question of consent, and whether there is consent is governed 
by ordinary principles of contract law.6 
However, as a consequence of the separability doctrine, the law chosen 
to govern the main contract will not automatically extend to the arbitration 
clause. As submitted by some authors, when the formal validity of an 
arbitration clause is at issue, the CISG will never be applicable. Instead, this 
issue would be preempted by Article II of the New York Convention, which 
obliges national courts to recognize “agreements in writing.”7 Further, 
unlike CISG Article 18(3), which permits formation of a contract of sale by 
conduct, many arbitration laws require a clearer manifestation of consent to 
be bound by an arbitration agreement.8 Under pre-CISG case law, some 
tribunals considered that when one party sent a written contract containing 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 Jack Graves, CISG Article 6 and Issues of Formation: The Problem of Circularity, 108 
BELGRD. L. REV. 124, 127 (2011) (quoting CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 9, Consequences of 
Avoidance, 3.3 (2008)). 
4 Stefan M. Kroll, Selected Problems Concerning the CISG’s Scope of Application, 25 J.L. & 
COM. 39, 43 (2005). 
5 Id. 
6 MARGARET M. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 19 (2d ed. 2012). 
7 Janet Walker, Agreeing to Disagree: Can We Just Have Words? CISG Article 11 and the Model 
Law Writing Requirement, 25 J.L. & COM. 153, 163 (2005). 
8 For example, Article 807 of the Italian Civil Procedure Code (Title VII of Book IV) provides 
that “[t]he submission to arbitration shall, under penalty of nullity, be made in writing and shall indicate 
the subject matter of the dispute. The written form requirement is considered complied with when the 
intention of the parties is expressed by telegram or telex.” 
Article 1031(1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Tenth Book) provides that “[t]he 
arbitration agreement shall be contained either in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of 
letters, telefaxes, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the 
agreement.” Similar provisions may be found in arbitration acts of other (particularly civil law) 
jurisdictions. 
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an arbitration clause and the other never signed or returned it, but 
nevertheless performed its obligations under the contract, there was no 
exchange of documents by the parties, and therefore, the arbitration clause 
was invalid.9 According to this approach, unlike the main contract, which 
can be formed by conduct, an arbitration clause, as a provision separable 
from the main contract, cannot be formed in such a way. 
Some scholars believe, however, that one of the CISG’s goals is to 
change this trend. Professor Klaus Peter Berger states that “similar to 
contracts concluded by tacit acceptance by one party, the admissibility of 
purely oral agreements [to arbitrate] corresponds to the needs of 
international commercial practice. This is manifested in the UN Sales 
Convention.”10 Even though our hypothetical is not concerned with a purely 
oral arbitration agreement (instead, the parties have orally amended the 
agreement from the Buyer’s standard form), Professor Berger’s statement 
reflects the similar nature of sales contracts and arbitration agreements. 
Therefore, the question asked in this paper is whether CISG, as the law 
applicable to the main contract, can be applied to the process of 
determining the true intent of the parties to arbitrate (or, alternatively, an 
absence of such intent). 
It is argued that the doctrine of separability does not preclude the 
application of the CISG at the stage of contract formation. Instead, the 
doctrine is confined to the limits of Article 81 of the CISG. Article 81 
comes into effect only upon avoidance of the contract and, as such, does not 
subject the formation of arbitration agreement to a law different from the 
one of the main contract. As noted in the Secretariat Commentary on 
Article 81, “[Article 81] would not make valid an arbitration clause, a 
penalty clause, or other provision in respect of the settlement of disputes if 
such a clause was not otherwise valid under the applicable national law; 
[Article 81] . . . states only that such a provision is not terminated by the 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 See Frey v. Cuccaro e Figli, 1 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 193 (Ct. App. Napoli 1976). In this case only 
two out of four contracts were signed and returned. The court subsequently enforced an award based on 
arbitration clauses in contracts that were signed and returned. The court stated that “where the 
confirmation of sale is not returned a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement does not exist, 
regardless of the lex loci, which might not require the written form.” 
10 BERGER, supra note 2, at 352. 
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avoidance of the contract.”11 There are, however, those who argue against 
the application of the CISG in order to relax formal requirements to the 
formation of arbitration agreements.12 Robert Koch submits that although 
the CISG may apply to the process of formation, it does not apply to the 
requirements of formal validity.13 The issues of contract formation, 
interpretation (Article 8 CISG) and validity will be considered in turn. 
III. FORMATION OF CONTRACT 
Our inquiry will start with Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich International 
Corp., probably the most famous U.S. case on the topic of contract 
formation that is still in good standing. In that case, the federal court for the 
Southern District of New York had to decide whether the parties, through 
an exchange of correspondence, had formed an arbitration agreement. In 
making its determination, the court considered the intent of the parties 
(inter alia, in accordance with Article 8 of the CISG). A brief account of 
the facts is provided below. 
An Italian footwear manufacturer (Filanto) brought an action against a 
New York export-import firm (Chilewich), alleging breach of contract. The 
dispute originated out of a contract concluded by Chilevich’s agent in 
London with a Soviet Import-Export Association (Raznoexport). According 
to the terms of the contract, Chilewich was to supply footwear to 
Raznoexport. The contract concluded between Chilewich’s agent and 
Raznoexport contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration in 
Moscow. Chilewich then contracted with Filanto to fulfill the orders from 
Raznoexport. The parties had several exchanges of correspondence. When 
the dispute later arose, the parties disagreed over whether the sales contract 
between Chilewich and Filanto included the arbitration clause contained in 
the original contract concluded by Chilewich’s agent and Raznoexport. 
Filanto alleged that it expressly refused to be bound by the arbitration 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 See Secretariat Commentary on Article 66 of the 1976 Draft (draft counterpart of Article 81) 
(1976), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-81.html. 
12 See, e.g., Robert Koch, The CISG as the Law Applicable to Arbitration Agreements, in 
SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR 
ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 267, 286 (Camilla B. Andersen & 
Urlich G. Schroeter eds., 2008). 
13 Id. 
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clause in the contract of sale and was only to comply with provisions as to 
packing, shipment, and acceptance of goods. Chilewich, on the other hand, 
submitted that the Memorandum Agreement, covering the contract between 
the parties and dated March 13, 1990, expressly incorporated the terms in 
Chilewich’s contract with Raznoexport, including the arbitration clause 
therein. Chilewich had signed the Memorandum Agreement and sent it to 
Filanto. Filanto did not sign the Memorandum. Nevertheless on May 7, 
1990, Chilewich opened a letter of credit in Filanto’s favor. 
On August 7, 1990, Filanto finally returned the Memorandum 
Agreement, signed and accompanied by a cover letter stating that it 
considered itself bound only by the points of the Chilewich-Raznoexport 
contract that Filanto specified (i.e. packing, shipping and acceptance). In 
court, Chilewich argued that the Memorandum Agreements sent to Filanto 
on March 13, 1990 constituted an offer. Chilewich further contended that 
the acceptance by Filanto of a letter of credit opened by Chilewich also 
implied the acceptance of the terms of the Memorandum Agreement. 
The CISG was found to be applicable as a federal law. The court 
invoked Article 19 of the CISG, stating that the August 7, 1990 letter was a 
counteroffer, which, according to the court, Chilewich then rejected. The 
court also specifically mentioned Article 81(1) of the CISG, which provides 
for the “severability” of dispute resolution clauses in case the contract is 
avoided. The court noted that such clauses are “severable,” probably 
meaning that they are not separate at the beginning and are subject to the 
same contract formation rules as the rest of the contract. Indeed, according 
to some commentators, arbitration agreements are not “separate,” and as 
such, Professor Davor Babic rightfully points out that arbitration clauses are 
only “separable” and not “separate.”14 
As pointed out by Professors Ronald Brand and Harry Flechtner, in 
Filanto v. Chilewich, the court ends without a clear statement concerning 
the importance of the Sales Convention to its holding, citing instead to the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and case law that supports a general 
policy favoring arbitration.15 The Filanto court, however, specifically 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 Statement made during Professor Babic’s lectures on European private law at the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law in February 2012. Notes are on the file with the author. 
15 Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flecthner, Arbitration and Contract Formation in International 
Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N. Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & COM. 239, 260 (1993). 
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pointed out that Article 8(3) of the Sales Convention may be used to 
ascertain whether the parties intended to conclude a contract containing an 
arbitration clause.16 Even though the Filanto court considered issues 
distinct from the ones in our hypothetical, it provided one of the first 
examples of applying the CISG to the formation of arbitration agreements. 
It negated, at least in part, the presumption against applying ordinary 
contract law principles to the process of determining the parties’ intent to 
arbitrate. 
In another case, an arbitral tribunal sitting in Zurich had to decide 
whether a valid arbitration agreement had been concluded between the 
parties based on a contractual clause providing for submission of disputes 
“to international and trade arbitration organization in Zurich, 
Switzerland.”17 The claimant contended that the Zurich Chamber of 
Commerce was the designated institution, whereas the respondent argued 
that, since the clause did not clearly specify the arbitral institution, it should 
be considered invalid.18 The arbitrator referred to both Article 18(1) of the 
Swiss Law of Obligations, which empowered him to ascertain the 
subjective intent of the parties, and to Article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code, 
dealing with good faith. Finding a valid arbitration agreement, the arbitrator 
then referred to Articles 4.1. and 4.2. of the UNIDROIT Principles, in an 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 Filanto, S.p.A. v Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
17 Bruno Zeller, Determining the Contractual Intent of the Parties under the CISG and Common 
Law—A Comparative Analysis, 4 EUR. J.L. REFORM 629, 636 (2002) (quoting Case No. 7645, 11 ICC 
Int’l C. Arb. Bull. 34 (ICC Int’s Ct. Arb. 1994)), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
zeller8.html#32. 
18 For a similar set of circumstances, see Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g 
Ltd., 2 H.K.L.R. 73 (H.C. 1993). The arbitration clause in the contract provided for arbitration “in a 
third country, under the rule of a third country and in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 
International Commercial Arbitration Association.” The plaintiff sued for damages in Hong Kong courts 
and the defendant sought a stay of the proceedings pursuant to Article 8 of the Model Law. The plaintiff 
argued that the arbitration agreement should be considered either null and void, since it referred by 
mistake to an unspecified third country, or inoperative, since it referred to a non-existent organization or 
to non-existent rules. Although it did not reference the CISG, the court found that the arbitration clause 
sufficiently indicated the parties’ intentions to arbitrate. 
Judge Kaplan articulated his reasoning as follows: 
I believe that the correct approach in this case is to satisfy myself that the parties have 
clearly expressed the intention to arbitrate any dispute which may arise under this contract. 
I am so satisfied. As to the reference to the non-existent arbitration institution and rules, I 
believe that the correct approach is simply to ignore it. I can give no effect to it and I reject 
all reference to it so as to be able to give effect to the clear intention of the parties. 
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attempt to reflect the international nature of the dispute. Article 4 of the 
Principles provides, in essence, that the contract should be interpreted in 
accordance with common intention of the parties (Article 4.1.(1)), and in 
cases when “such an intention cannot be established, the contract shall be 
interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons of the same 
kind as the parties would give to it in the same circumstances.” (Article 
4.1.(2)). Regarding statements and “other conduct” of the party, Article 4.2. 
of the UNDROIT Principles states that “the statements and other conduct of 
a party shall be interpreted according to that party’s intention if the other 
party knew or could not have been unaware of that intention.” (Article 
4.2.(1)). Further, “if it is impossible to ascertain the meaning of the party’s 
statements or conduct in accordance with its intent, such statements and 
conduct shall be interpreted according to the meaning that a reasonable 
person of the same kind as the other party would give to it in the same 
circumstances.” (Article 4.2(2)). As submitted by Professor Bruno Zeller, 
the same result would have been reached under Article 8 of the CISG.19 
IV. ARTICLE 8—APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF INTERPRETATION 
Article 8 of the CISG provides guidelines for determining the parties’ 
intentions where their language or conduct is ambiguous or where, to the 
knowledge of the other party, “the first party was operating under a 
mistaken assumption of fact.”20Article 8 provides for a three-step analysis 
for ascertaining the contractual intent of the parties. Conduct or statements 
of a party should be interpreted according to that party’s actual (subjective) 
intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware of that 
intent (Article 8(1)). Where the prerequisites for applying the previous rule 
are not present (i.e., where a party has not shown a particular subjective 
intent behind its statements or conduct, or the other party did not know and 
could have been unaware of the first party’s subjective intent), the analysis 
then turns to a reasonable person’s understanding of the statements or 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 Zeller, supra note 17 n.33. 
20 Jacob S. Ziegel & Claude Samson, Comment on Article 8 of the Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, REPORT TO THE UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA ON 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (July 1981), 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ziegel8.html. 
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conduct of a party (Article 8(2)). In determining a party’s subjective intent 
or the reasonable person’s understanding of a party’s statements or conduct, 
courts and tribunals are permitted to look into the circumstances 
surrounding the contract (Article 8(3)). 
The practical importance of Article 8 is that it helps to ascertain the 
intent of the parties when some terms of an arbitration agreement are 
missing or in cases when an arbitration clause in writing does not (at least 
allegedly) represent the true intent of the parties. Examples of this would be 
when parties use a standard form agreement, but in fact intend to validate 
only parts of it; or in cases similar to the hypothetical above, when only one 
party sends its standard contract, and later on the parties orally agree to 
modify some elements of a contractual clause and thereafter one party 
performs. 
The question to be answered is what are the standards for ascertaining 
the parties’ intent in cases when the arbitral tribunal decides to use the 
CISG to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement? As pointed 
out above, Article 8(1) states that conduct or statements of a party should be 
interpreted according to that party’s actual (subjective) intent where the 
other party knew or could not have been unaware of that intent. This means 
that where an addressee of the statement does not recognize the intent of the 
party making the statement, even though it is easily recognizable, the 
addressee will be bound by the declaring party’s subjective intentions.21 
And, if the addressee understands the declaring party’s real subjective 
intentions despite that party’s unclear or incorrect language, the declaring 
party’s subjective intention will be binding, regardless of the understanding 
that the reasonable person might have had.22 
The inquiry into the application of Article 8 of the CISG in the process 
of ascertaining the content of arbitration agreements should start with the 
basic premise that different parts of an arbitration agreement may 
sometimes become subject to a dispute. An arbitration agreement itself may 
be divided into terms that are deemed material and those that are not.23 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Franco Ferrari, Interpretation of Statements: Article 8, in THE DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST AND 
BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION 172, 174 
(Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 2005). 
22 Id. 
23 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 619 (2009). 
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Choice of law, arbitral seat, institutional rules and means of selecting 
arbitrators are usually considered as material.24 In some jurisdictions, this 
divide has resulted in the application of formal requirements only to the 
material terms of arbitration agreements.25 
MCC Marble Ceramics v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino is illustrative 
of the application of Article 8(1), since it provides an example of a case 
where the parties subjectively may not have intended to be bound by some 
provisions of a written contract they had signed. In that case, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that under Article 8(1) of the CISG, the parties’ shared 
subjective intent governed their contract, even absent objective 
manifestation of that intent. The court reasoned that “Article 8(1) is not 
limited to interpretation of the terms of a contract, but by its express terms 
encompasses interpretation of the parties’ conduct.”26 
MCC Marble Ceramics (MCC), a U.S. corporation concluded an 
agreement to purchase ceramic tiles with Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino 
(D’Agostino), an Italian tile manufacturer. The parties negotiated the 
essential terms of the agreement at a trade fair in Bologna. These terms 
were recorded on D’Agostino’s standard order form, written in Italian, 
which contained provisions as to the sanctions for non-payment by the 
buyer as well as a clause requiring that the buyer give written notice within 
10 days of delivery if the buyer claimed the delivered goods were non-
conforming. Later, MCC sued D’Agostino for an alleged failure to fulfill 
one of its orders. D’Agostino counterclaimed, alleging non-payment by 
MCC for earlier deliveries. As a defense against MCC’s claim of failure to 
deliver, D’Agostino invoked, among other things, a clause in the signed 
preprinted form that gave it the right to suspend or cancel the contract in 
case of a delay in payment by the buyer. As a defense against D’Agostino’s 
counterclaim for the full price of earlier deliveries, MCC argued that those 
deliveries included non-conforming goods and that MCC had notified 
D’Agostino by telephone of this fact. D’Agostino countered by invoking 
                                                                                                                           
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Harry M. Flechtner, The U.N. Sales Convention (CISG) and MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. 
v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.P.A.: The Eleventh Circuit Weighs in on Interpretation, Subjective 
Intent, Procedural Limits to the Convention's Scope, and the Parol Evidence Rule, 18 J.L. & COM. 259, 
265 (1999). 
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the contract clause requiring that a written notice of claims of non-
conformity be given within 10 days of delivery. MCC did not dispute the 
underlying facts; it argued instead that the parties had no subjective intent 
to be bound by the terms on the reverse (in particular those that concerned 
notice and late payment). MCC submitted affidavits supporting this 
assertion from its own president who had signed the contract in Bologna 
and from D’Agostino’s representatives at the trade fair, both of whom had 
thereafter left D’Agostino’s employ. 
Although the court found that sophisticated merchants must generally 
know the content of the agreement they sign, it nevertheless concluded that 
MCC’s affidavits offered evidence of a subjective intent by both the 
president of MCC and by the representatives of D’Agostino not to be bound 
by the provisions on the reverse of D’Agostino’s form. Thus, the court 
reasoned, “the case fell ‘squarely within article 8(1) of the CISG, and 
therefore require[d] the court to consider MCC’s evidence as it interpret[ed] 
the parties’ conduct.’”27 The determination of consent was largely confined 
to the subjective intent of the parties. However, in some instances, the 
application of Article 8(1) requires that the parties have a close relationship 
and know each other well, or that the import of the statements or conduct 
was clear and easily understood by the other party.28 Thus, a more 
substantive inquiry, as provided for in Article 8(3) of the CISG, may often 
be required. Before one turns to the analysis of Article 8(3), the content of 
the second subsection of this Article must be mentioned, as Article 8(3) 
merely clarifies the meaning of Article 8(2). Article 8(2) states that “if the 
preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other 
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that 
a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in 
the same circumstances.” 
The express reference of Article 8(2) to the “reasonable person of the 
same kind” is not accidental. At the Vienna Convention, the delegates 
agreed “to refer to ‘a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party’ 
instead of just ‘a reasonable person’ in order to indicate the characteristic 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 Id. at 266 (quoting MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, 144 
F.3d 1384, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
28 Magnesium Case, No. 8324 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. 1995), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/958324i1.html. 
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that should be assumed on the part of the reasonable person and to make it 
clear that the reference is to the party to whom the statement was addressed 
and not to the party making the statement.”29 As Professor Jelena Vilus 
explains, “[i]t was considered that these additional words would make the 
reasonable person criterion more impartial, since it was related to a person 
engaged in the same branch of business, or in the same trade.”30 As a matter 
of practice, arbitration clauses are sometimes drafted by people who are 
either non-lawyers or have very little or no experience in the field of 
international commercial arbitration. In such a case, the “reasonable 
person” standard of Article 8(2) would oblige an arbitral tribunal to give 
regard the level of a party’s knowledge of international arbitration.31 
Now, our inquiry will focus on the facts of the hypothetical, wherein 
the amended arbitration clause allegedly designated Singapore as the legal 
seat. In the absence of the clear intent of the parties, the arbitral tribunal 
(deriving its authority from the doctrine of competence discussed above) 
will have power to designate the seat of arbitration.32 Interpretation of the 
parties’ agreement as to the seat of arbitration should be left to the arbitral 
tribunal or arbitral institution.33 Article 8(3) would authorize the tribunal to 
consider “all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, 
any practices which the parties have established between themselves, 
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.” It is important to note 
that this discussion is not concerned with usages mentioned in Article 9(2). 
In contrast to the meaning of “usages” under Article 9, Article 8(3) focuses 
on usages “which are only local, national, or followed by a particular group 
of business people.”34 Professor Peter Schlechtriem provides a clear 
illustration of different meanings of the term “usages” when he states that 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 E. Allan Farnsworth, Commentary on Article 8 CISG, in BIANCA-BONELL COMMENTARY ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 94, 96 (Massimo Bianca & Michael Bonnel eds., 1987), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/farnsworth-bb8.html. 
30 Jelena Vilus, Common Law Institutions in the United Nations Sales Convention, in 2 STUDIOS 
EN HOMENAJE A JORGE BARRERA GRAF 1431, 1441 (1989) (Mex.). 
31 Case No. 10422 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. 1994). 
32 See BERGER, supra note 2, at 106. 
33 BORN, supra note 21, at 1720. 
34 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW—THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 39 (1986). 
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[A]ccording to Article 8(3), the particular circumstances are important, including 
usages that are possibly significant only to a party making the statements or to a 
reasonable person in the rule of the addressee. For example, a German who 
remains silent after having received a letter of confirmation can be understood to 
have expressed approval, regardless of whether Article 9(2) includes the German 
customs pertaining to letters of confirmation.35 
Applied to our case, the determination of the arbitral seat will likely depend 
on whether Singapore is a convenient seat and/or whether it is common for 
the parties from similar or the same geographical location to select 
Singapore as a seat for international arbitration. There is, however, “no 
limit under Article 8(3) as to what one can refer to in order to get at the 
meaning of a statement or conduct.”36 Therefore, when deciding upon the 
seat of arbitration, the tribunal is free to consider “all other relevant 
circumstances.” 
V. ARTICLE 29 CONCERN 
In our hypothetical, the parties have orally amended the arbitration 
clause from the Buyer’s standard form. Under Article 29 of the CISG, a 
contractual provision may be amended in any form. Article 29(1) provides 
that “a contract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of 
the parties.” The second subsection of the Article suggests, nevertheless, 
that the parties will be barred from orally amending the contract, in cases 
where the contract contains a clause that expressly prohibits such an 
amendment (Article 29(2)). However, a party may be precluded by his 
conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that the other party 
has relied on that conduct. 
An oral agreement to modify a contract could be considered 
“‘conduct’ that would preclude [a party] from invoking the contract clause 
‘to the extent that the other party has relied on that conduct.’”37 In order to 
                                                                                                                           
 
35 Id. 
36 Chan Leng Sun, Interpreting an International Sale Contract, CELEBRATING SUCCESS: 25 
YEARS UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(COLLATION OF PAPERS AT UNCITRAL-SIAC CONFERENCE) 78 (Sept. 22–23, 2005), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sun1.html. 
37 JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION 231 (3d ed. 1999) (quoting Secretariat Commentary art. 27, para. 9, O.R. 28, 
Docy. Hist. 418). 
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determine the party’s reliance on the conduct of the other party, courts and 
arbitral tribunals may invoke Article 8.38 As one of the CISG’s general 
provisions, Article 8 applies whenever a statement or conduct of a party is 
to be interpreted with a view to determining its contents.39 The CISG case 
law supports this proposition. In a case decided by the Appellate Court of 
Dusseldorf (Oberlandesgericht Dusserldorf) a German buyer (defendant) 
entered into a contract of sale with an Italian seller (plaintiff). The contract 
concerned the sale of clothes. Twenty-five days after the date of delivery, 
the buyer notified seller that the goods were non-conforming. The seller 
recovered the goods for examination and granted a pro forma credit note to 
the buyer. After examination, the seller denied non-conformity and sued the 
buyer for the purchase price. The court had to consider, inter alia, whether 
the seller granting a credit note constituted acceptance of the termination of 
the contract, as the buyer had proposed. With reference to Article 8(2), the 
court held that 
the contract was not terminated by agreement of the parties as provided under 
Article 29 CISG. When granting the credit note, the seller had no intention to 
accept the buyer’s proposed termination. The note was issued pro forma, and 
there was no reason for the buyer to interpret this as the outcome of the 
examination of the goods by the seller. 
The court expressly referred to the standard of Article 8(2) when 
determining whether the buyer had reasonably interpreted the actions of the 
seller. For the purposes of our hypothetical, even if the Buyer’s standard 
contract contained a no-oral-modification clause, the Buyer would be 
precluded from invoking that clause because the Seller relied on the oral 
amendment by thereafter shipping the goods. 
As outlined above, this discussion will now turn to the question of 
whether or not the award based on an amended arbitration agreement, such 
as the one in our hypothetical, would be able to avoid the challenge of 
setting aside and be enforced under the New York Convention. 
                                                                                                                           
 
38 See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck, Docket No. 1 R 273/07t (App. Ct. Innsbruck 2007) 
(Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071218a3.html (expressly stating that when 
considering whether to give effect to the no-oral-modification clause in the parties’ contract, “it is in any 
case decisive what the parties themselves determined as written form and how this agreement has to be 
interpreted by applying Article 8 CISG”). 
39 Ferrari, supra note 21. 
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VI. FORMAL VALIDITY 
The provisions of the New York Convention on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration sets out the formal validity 
requirements that an arbitration agreement needs to meet in order to be 
considered valid for the purposes of enforcement. Article V(1) of the New 
York Convention commands the courts of each contracting state “to 
recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties intend to submit 
to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen, or which may arise 
between them in respect of defined legal relationship.” 
Most authorities hold that Article II(2) of the New York Convention 
set forth an exclusive, uniform rule of formal validity for arbitration 
agreements.40 Article II(2) states, that in order to be considered as “in 
writing” an arbitration agreement must “include an arbitral clause in a 
contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in 
an exchange of letters or telegrams.” Some argue that the requirements of 
the Convention are obsolete and are not representative of modern 
commercial practices.41 Earlier, the idea of limiting the application of an 
obligation to arbitrate was largely based on concern over forfeiture of a 
party’s right to present its case in a national court, thus prompting the 
special validity rule of Article II(2) of the New York Convention as a 
heightened burden necessary to prove the party’s will to abandon its 
fundamental right to go to court.42 Whereas the New York Convention 
treats arbitration as a truly “alternative” means of dispute resolution, the 
modern practice shows that it has become rather “normative.”43 
                                                                                                                           
 
40 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS 23 (2d ed. 2001). 
41 See, e.g., Jack Graves, ICA and the Writing Requirement: Following Modern Trends Towards 
Liberalization or are We Stuck in 1958?, 107 BELGRD. L. REV. 36, 44 (2009) (Serb.). 
42 Jeffrey Waincymer, The CISG and International Commercial Arbitration: Promoting a 
Complimentary Relationship Between Substance and Procedure, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE 
OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY, supra note 12, at 582, 588. 
43 Graves, supra note 41, at 43. 
2012-2013] CISG AND ARBITRATION CLAUSES 151 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.50 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Although the New York Convention provides for rather rigid formal 
validity requirements, it also provides an escape clause in Article VII,44 
which gives the parties an opportunity to rely on more favorable provisions 
of the laws and treaties of the country where the award is sought to be 
enforced. “In other words,” Professor Nina Tepes explains, the “application 
of the New York Convention cannot result in the situation where a party 
would be deprived of any rights it has according to more liberal provisions 
of the law of the country where enforcement procedures are taking place.”45 
The question here is whether the CISG may be used as a more favorable 
international treaty by the party attempting to validate an award in cases 
where the other party seeks to bar enforcement based on alleged flaws and 
ambiguities in the agreement itself, or based on the fact that the parties have 
(at least according to the wining party) made an oral amendment to the 
agreement in writing. The strict writing requirement of Article II of the 
New York Convention, if read literally, would bar such a clause from 
recognition notwithstanding “the more favorable law” provision of Article 
VII. Professor Janet Walker formulates the general problem in clearer terms 
when she states that: 
The concern is not, and has never been, with those situations in which the 
parties are able to arrange their affairs so as to make plain their intentions for 
dispute resolution. The concern is with the increasingly rapid and routine 
transaction of business across borders, particularly business between small firms 
and sole proprietorships, in which there is little or no scope for negotiating the 
form or forum for dispute resolution.46 
Some authors submit, however, that whenever the New York 
Convention proves to be less favorable to a party “seeking to avail himself 
of an arbitral award” than the provisions of another treaty or law of the 
country where the enforcement is sought, “the more favorable law” 
provision of Article VII shall prevail over the strict formal requirements of 
                                                                                                                           
 
44 Article VII(1) of the Convention reads: “The provisions of the present Convention shall not . . . 
deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner 
and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be 
relied upon.” 
45 Nina Tepes, The More Favorable Right Provision of Art. VII of the New York Convention and 
Its Application to the Form of the Arbitration Agreement, 12 CROAT. ARBIT. Y.B. 125, 125–26 (2005). 
46 Walker, supra note 7, at 162. 
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Article II.47 Others argue a different point, that even if applied in an attempt 
to validate an oral arbitration agreement or an agreement the terms of which 
are ambiguous, the CISG will not affect the application of any other treaties 
(Article 90 CISG), such as the New York Convention. According to this 
view, the New York Convention should prevail as lex specialis, that is, the 
law applicable directly to recognition and enforcement, as opposed to the 
CISG as lex generalis in order to validate arbitration clauses in the main 
container contract. Professor Walker submits that “Article 90 of the CISG 
provides for deference to international agreements, raising the possibility 
that, despite the treatment of the dispute resolution clause as just another 
term of the contract, the CISG intended to permit the writing requirement of 
the New York Convention to prevail.”48 
The courts of some countries have nevertheless deviated from the strict 
mandate of Article II of the New York Convention. These deviations go so 
far as favoring recognition of arbitration clauses based on an oral 
agreement. The two different approaches taken by the drafters of the 2006 
version of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration reflect the discrepancies between attitudes towards arbitration 
clauses. Article 7 of the Model Law lays out formal requirements for 
arbitration clauses. In regard to Article 7, the Model Law jurisdictions can 
adopt either one of the two options provided within the text of the Model 
Law. Option I provides that the arbitration agreement shall be in writing. It 
also states that an arbitration agreement is considered to be “in writing” as 
long as “its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the arbitration 
agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other 
means.” Option II removes any requirement as to form including the 
“record” provision. 
In the New York Convention Recommendation Regarding the 
Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2, and Article VII, Paragraph 1, 
UNCITRAL urged the Model Law countries to apply the “most favorable 
law” provision of Article VII so that it will relax the formal validity 
requirements contained in Article II. Therefore, the New York Convention 
                                                                                                                           
 
47 EMMANUEL GAILLARD, ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 69–70 (Emmanuel Gaillard & 
Domenico di Pierto eds., 2008). 
48 Walker, supra note 7, at 163. 
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Article II, if read in light of UNCITRAL’s Recommendation would 
recognize a record of the “contents” of the agreement “in any form” as 
equivalent to a traditional “writing” in requiring an arbitration agreement to 
be in written form.49 The agreement to arbitrate may be entered into in any 
form (e.g. including orally) as long as the content of the agreement is 
recorded.50 An arbitration agreement, if made orally, can be enforced if the 
parties can sufficiently provide evidence that the parties consented to 
arbitrate.51 Some courts have held that a witness testimony would generally 
serve the purpose of providing a sufficient record of an oral agreement.52 
The amended provisions of the Model Law represent a conscious 
effort to modernize the outdated mandate of Art. II of the New York 
Convention, an effort supported by the majority of leading arbitration 
jurisdictions.53 It is natural that the New York Convention is often 
construed in light of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which represents the 
development of the line of thought upon which the Convention is based.54 
However, on the other hand, the signatory countries may or may not adopt 
the amendments proposed by UNCITRAL. 
The UNCITRAL Working Group II on Arbitration and Conciliation, 
charged with the task of creating model legislative provisions for written 
form of the arbitration agreements, was certainly aware of the disparities in 
interpretation of formal validity provisions. To accommodate the objection 
concerning the reference in an oral contract to a set of arbitration rules in 
particular, the Working Group agreed to include a proviso, the effect of 
which is to rely on domestic, or other applicable law to determine whether 
an oral reference to a set of procedural rules is such as to make that clause 
part of the contract notwithstanding that the contract or the arbitration 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. VII (2006). 
50 Id. 
51 Peter Kucherepa, Reviewing Trends and Proposals to Recognize Oral Agreements to Arbitrate 
in International Arbitration Law, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 409, 416 (2005). 
52 H. Small Limited v. Goldroyce Garment Ltd. [1994], 2 H.K.L.R. 526 (H.C.), 
http://interarb.com/clout/clout064.htm. 
53 Tepes, supra note 45. 
54 Giuditta Cordero-Moss, Risk of Conflict Between the New York Convention and the Newer 
Arbitration-Friendly National Legislation?, FOLK UIO NO, http://folk.uio.no/giudittm/Form%20of%20 
arbitration%20clause.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). 
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agreement has been concluded orally.55 Therefore, at least according to the 
current trend exhibited under the 2006 version of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Arbitration, the ultimate validity of an arbitration 
clause depends greatly on the applicable domestic law. 
Although the Recommendation of UNCITRAL might be given 
considerable weight when construing the New York Convention, it remains 
to be seen whether the adoption of a more relaxed form of Article 7 of the 
Model Law Option II will be sufficient to shift the by-far persistent 
formalistic attitudes in treatment and interpretation of Article II(2) of the 
New York Convention.56 A brief discussion of relevant domestic law 
provisions enacted in some leading arbitration jurisdictions follows below. 
A. France 
France is home to the headquarters of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). As a result, it is often picked as a legal seat for 
international arbitrations. As explained below, in May 2011, the French 
arbitration policy experienced a shift towards a more liberal attitude to the 
question of the formality of arbitration clauses. 
The prior provisions of the French Code of Civil Procedure relating to 
this issue required an arbitration clause to be in writing.57 Article 1443 of 
the 1981 French Code of Civil Procedure provided that, in order to be valid, 
“an arbitration clause shall be in writing and included in the contract or in a 
document to which it refers.” Furthermore, to be valid, an arbitration clause 
should appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators, or provide for a method of their 
appointment. Quite to the contrary, the current Article 1507, as amended by 
the arbitration decree of 13 January, 2011 (décret n° 2011-48 
portantréforme de l’arbitrage), states that “an agreement to arbitrate is not 
                                                                                                                           
 
55 Note on the Deliberations of the Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on 
Preparation of a Model Legislative Provision on a Written Form for Arbitration Agreement, 
UNCITRAL Forty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 4 A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.136 (July 19, 2005), available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V05/867/53/PDF/V0586753.pdf?OpenElement (see 
¶ 11 at 4). 
56 Id. at 5. 
57 CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 1443 (Fr. 1981). 
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subject to any requirements as to form.”58 According to some 
commentators, this reform was introduced with a view to sustaining 
France’s leading role in international arbitration.59 
As perceived in France, the arbitration agreement in international 
arbitration was not subject to any national law at all, but was governed 
exclusively by material principles derived from French conceptions of 
international public policy.60 In Bomar,61 the Cour de Cassation decided the 
question of validity based on “a material rule of international commercial 
arbitration,” without alluding to any particular law.62 Therefore, the 
amended articles of the French Code of Civil Procedure seem to only 
confirm a prior liberal attitude of French courts towards arbitration 
agreements. 
B. Sweden 
Sweden is home to the world-renowned Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). The Swedish Arbitration Act is 
silent on any formal requirements for an agreement to arbitrate. An oral 
agreement is sufficient for arbitration in Sweden.63 Thus, general contract 
law principles would be applicable to determine whether parties have a 
valid agreement to arbitrate.64 This may, however, cause problems at the 
enforcement stage.65 In order to enforce arbitration awards abroad on the 
basis of the New York Convention, the safest course is to assume that the 
documentation requirement stated in the Convention must be fulfilled.66 If 
the opposing party denies the existence of an arbitration agreement, the 
                                                                                                                           
 
58 CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 1507 (Fr. 2011) (the writing requirement of Article 
1443 is now mandatory only for domestic arbitrations). 
59 Maxi Scherer, Long Awaited New French Arbitration Law Revealed, NYU TRANSNATIONAL 
NOTES, http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/transnational/2011/02/long-awaited-new-french-arbitration-law-
revealed/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
60 JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 163 (2007). 
61 Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 11, 1989 Bull. Civ. 
I, No. 314 (Fr.). 
62 POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 60. 
63 Id. 
64 FINN MADSEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN 47 (2d ed. 2007). 
65 POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 60. 
66 Id. 
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application for enforcement must also provide the arbitration agreement or 
otherwise prove (in case of an oral agreement) that an arbitration agreement 
has been entered into.67 This leaves the question of consent and validity 
entirely to the Swedish domestic contract law. 
C. Germany 
In Germany the formal validity requirements for arbitration 
agreements are spelled out in Section 1031 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
(ZPO).68 Under German law, oral consent to arbitration is now impossible 
even between merchants.69 The most-favorable treatment principle does not 
apply regardless of whether the issue is one of enforcement, or when the 
arbitration clause is raised as a defense against admissibility of court 
proceedings.70 Moreover, if the parties have additionally subjected the 
arbitration agreement to the law of another country, the relevant provisions 
of that country and Section 1031 ZPO apply cumulatively.71 Thus, under 
German law, a party wishing to set an arbitration award aside on the basis 
of formal invalidity has a greater chance of success than in many other 
jurisdictions. 
D. Austria 
Similarly to Germany, Austria adheres to a more restrictive approach 
toward the form of arbitration agreements.72 This is due to several reasons. 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 Olga Zalepukina, Hans Bagner & Julia Lannerheim, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Awards in Sweden, UKR. J. BUS. & L. 42, 43 (2008), available at http://www.vinge.se/upload/bocker_ 
artiklar/Eastern%20European%20Desk%20article.pdf. 
68 Zivilprozessordnung [Code of Civil Procedure] § 1031(1) (“The arbitration agreement shall be 
contained either in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of letters, telefaxes, telegrams or 
other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement.”). 
69 Rolf Trittmann & Inka Hanefeld, Form of Arbitration Agreement, in ARBITRATION IN 
GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 126, 129 (Karl Bockstiegel, Stefan Kroll & Patricia 
Nacimiento eds., 2008). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Schiedsrechts-Änderungsgesetz [Austrian Arbitration Act] § 581(1) (“An arbitration agreement 
is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which 
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. The 
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According to the Official Commentary to the new Austrian Arbitration Act 
of 2006, one of the primary concerns was that a provision too far removed 
from the New York Convention would lead to arbitral awards which 
were—contrary to general expectations—less easily enforceable in 
comparison to decisions of domestic courts.73 Due to this, Austria may lose 
its attractiveness as a place of arbitration and be demoted to a mere 
recognition-and-enforcement country. On the other hand, however, Austria 
may enjoy an advantage in the latter regard because arbitral awards that are 
not enforceable under the New York Convention, because they are based on 
“defaulted” arbitration agreements, would have been enforceable under 
Austrian law.74 
VII. ARBITRAL CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE CISG: GENERAL OVERVIEW 
For the purposes of this paper, the author will briefly discuss the 
factors the tribunal should consider to determine whether or not it should 
apply the CISG to determine the existence (and validity) of an arbitration 
clause. Article 28(2) of the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration expressly states: “failing any designation by the parties, the 
arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules 
which it considers applicable.” Some institutional rules also grant 
arbitrators the power to apply the rules of law they consider appropriate.75 
There are several connecting factors the arbitral panels normally 
consider in order to determine the rules appropriate for a specific dispute. 
These include the law of the place of arbitration, the law of the place where 
the arbitration agreement was concluded, the seat of a domestic trade 
                                                                                                                           
 
arbitration agreement may be concluded in the form of a separate agreement or as a clause within a 
contract.”). 
73 AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION ACT, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 16 (2006), http://www.cm.arbitration-
austria.at/dokumente/OfficialCommentAustrianArbitrationAct2006.pdf. 
74 Id. 
75 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION 11 (2010) (Article 17(1)) 
(expressly authorizes an arbitral tribunal to “apply the rules of law which it determines to be 
appropriate. Article 17(2) further provides that “In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of 
the provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages.”). 
158 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 31:135 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.50 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
organization which has published a standard form contract/arbitration 
agreement, and the law of the enforcing jurisdiction.76 
In practice, however, the law applicable to the main contract would be 
also deemed the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, unless there is 
a clear indication of the contrary.77 Also, the majority of arbitration 
agreements concluded throughout the world fall under the sphere of the 
application of the New York Convention.78 The following discussion will 
focus on two connecting factors, namely the law of the arbitral seat as well 
as the law of the enforcing jurisdiction, since the New Convention 
expressly makes arbitration agreements and subsequent awards subject to 
the scrutiny of these two legal regimes. Article V(1)(e) provides that the 
enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused in cases when the award 
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in 
which, or under the law of which, the award was made. Article V(2)(b) 
further provides that an award shall be refused enforcement if the 
recognition and enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of the 
enforcing country. Although it is commonly understood that a mere 
violation of a law of the enforcing country is not enough to constitute a 
public policy violation,79 the public policy factor remains significant at the 
enforcement stage. 
A. The Law of the Seat 
The seat of arbitration plays an important role in the New York 
Convention. Arbitral awards rendered by tribunals sitting in Contracting 
States have been confirmed when the claimant was a national of a country 
that had not acceded to the Convention.80 The practical implication of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
76 Leonardo Graffi, The Applicable to the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement: A Practitioner’s 
View, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 19, 33 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kroll 
eds., 2011). 
77 Id. at 36. 
78 Id. 
79 ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: AN OVERVIEW 
19 (1981). 
80 Javier Rubinstein & Georgina Fabian, The Territorial Scope of the New York Convention and 
Its Implementation in Common and Civil Law Countries, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 91, 
96 (Emmanuel Gaillard et al. eds., 2008). 
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choice of the seat is such that, even if the parties choose the law governing 
the contract, and even if they also chose some of the procedural rules to be 
applied by the arbitrators (e.g. institutional rules), they are nevertheless 
deemed to not have chosen the law governing the arbitration, except 
indirectly through choice of its situs.81 
Approaches nevertheless differ in how much significance is given to 
the seat.82 Suffice it to say, that the only place in the New York Convention 
where a reference is made to “law” directly, as opposed to rules, principles 
and public policy, is in Article V(1)(a), which states that enforcement of an 
arbitral award “may be refused if the said agreement is not valid under the 
law of the country where the award was made.” 
Even though there have been instances where the winning party 
managed to enforce an award that has been set aside on the basis of the 
“more favorable law” provision of Article VII,83 subsequent case law 
restored the previous order of things at least in the United States.84 The 
award, once set aside, cannot be (or is very unlikely to be) enforced in the 
United States. This is, however, not the case in France, where the mere fact 
that the award has been set aside would not bar enforcement in French 
courts.85 
The CISG, as any international treaty, is binding only on Contracting 
States. Arbitrators, on the other hand, cannot be equated to organs of any 
State.86 Thus, regardless of whether or not the place of arbitration lies in a 
state that has signed and ratified the CISG, a tribunal is not under the duty 
to apply the CISG.87 It, thus, follows that a tribunal sitting in a CISG state 
that has made a reservation under Article 96 it is not under an automatic 
obligation to apply the writing requirement either to the main contract or to 
the arbitration agreement. 
                                                                                                                           
 
81 William W. Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration, 32 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 21, 23 (1983). 
82 Id. at 24. 
83 In the Matter of Arbitration Between Chromalloy Aero Services, A Div. of Chromalloy Gas 
Turbine Corp. & Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). 
84 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta, 487 F.3d. 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
85 GAILLARD, supra note 47, at 77. 
86 Giorgios C. Petrochilos, Arbitration Conflict of Laws Rules and the 1980 International Sales 
Convention, 52 REV. H.D.I. 191, 218 (1999), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
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87 Nils Schmidt-Ahrendts, CISG and Arbitration, 107 BELGRD. L. REV. 211, 214 (2011). 
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B. The Law of the Enforcing Country 
As stated by Professor Emmanuel Gaillard, “the New York 
Convention considerably minimizes the importance of the law of the Seat 
and although it leaves the State of the seat free to control arbitrations 
carried out on its territory as it sees fit, it shifts the focus to the conditions 
of recognition of awards in the national legal orders where enforcement is 
sought.”88 The Convention thus clearly departs from the idea that the law of 
the seat is the only source of an award’s legal force.89 
While Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention specifically refers 
to the “law of the country where the award was made,” in Article V(2)(b) a 
reference is made to “the public policy of that country,” meaning the public 
policy of the enforcing jurisdiction. The scope of the term “public policy” is 
broader and less precise then the term “law.” Also, public policy has been 
characterized as “relative” and “purely theoretical.”90 
When considering whether a principle is sufficiently fundamental to 
justify refusing enforcement of an award, the enforcement court is entitled 
to have regard to the connections the parties and the subject matter have 
with the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought. Where there are few 
connections, the court would be entitled to take a more liberal approach.91 
Further, an award’s violation of a mere “mandatory rule” (i.e. an 
imperative rule of law that cannot be exclude by the agreement of the 
parties) should not bar its recognition or enforcement of the award, even 
when said rule forms part of the law of the forum, the law governing the 
contract, the law of the place of performance of the contract or the law of 
the seat of the arbitration.92 
It could, therefore, be suggested that non-application of the writing 
requirement by a tribunal does not render an award unenforceable in an 
Article 96 reserving state. The adoption of reservations, as expressed in 
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90 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Public Policy as a Limit to Arbitration and its Enforcement, IBA J. 
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91 Report to Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, Final Report on Public Policy 
as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, para. 40, New Dehli Conference (2002). 
92 Id. at para. 48. 
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Articles 12 and 96, only makes the freedom of form provisions of the CISG 
inapplicable.93 The text of the reservation does not itself set any restrictions 
as to form.94 Rather, the question whether an Article 96 reservation results 
in a requirement that an arbitration agreement be in writing should be 
answered with reference to the law applicable pursuant to conflicts of law 
provisions.95 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For a party trying to prove the content of an arbitration clause the use 
of CISG for that purpose does not seem to be an entirely hopeless exercise. 
In an attempt to determine the validity of an arbitration clause, a court or an 
arbitral tribunal would find at its disposal a good number of interpretative 
tools provided within Article 8 CISG. At the enforcement stage, the CISG 
may well be used as a more favorable treaty for the purposes of Article VII 
of the New York Convention. The amended UNCITRAL Model Law as 
well as many national arbitration laws, support this proposition. 
The parties should nevertheless be warned that the consequences of 
applying the CISG to the validation of arbitration agreements will 
ultimately depend on the national attitudes of at least two jurisdictions, that 
is, the country of the seat and the country of enforcement. 
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